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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

It is interesting to note, however, that here the Court was not only concerned with the freedom to travel. The freedom to travel was firmly bound
to the freedom to associate with groups of ones own choosing. Membership
in subversive organizations resulted in a bar to the use of a passport
necessary to travel.
The Aptheker decision makes it clear that Congress cannot validly prohibit peace-time foreign travel by all members of Communist organizations.
The decision further suggests that such travel might be limited if the act
proscribed the use of passports by individuals (a) knowing themselves to
be members of registered organizations and knowing the subversive purposes of such organizations, (b) being active in such organizations, and (c)
intending to travel abroad with the object of engaging in conduct that
could be dangerous to internal security. Whether a statute so limited could
effectively prevent subversives from engaging in conduct abroad that would
be dangerous to internal security appears doubtful. Dangerous activity
could be engaged in by inactive or seemingly inactive Party members.
Certainly, the intention of engaging in dangerous activities abroad would
not be truthfully communicated to passport officials before departure from
the United States. After the individual returned to the United States,
the giving of orders and exchange of secret information would have taken
place, the training would have been received, and the other dangerous
activities accomplished. More drastic measures would then be necessary
to minimize the effects of the activities.
It is now apparent, however, that the freedom to travel declared to be
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause will be viewed by the courts with
respect approaching that accorded to the First Amendment freedoms.
MRs. S. MELOY
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DETERMINING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSION VIOLATES THE DUE PRO-

the case of Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774 (1964), the United States Supreme
Court held that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness
of a confession did not adequately protect the defendant's constitutional
right' to be free from a conviction based on a coerced confession.
CESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-In

Under the New York rule, 2 the trial judge was required to make a
preliminary determination regarding the voluntariness of a confession
1 It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process
of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession,
without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 81 Sup. Ct. 735 (1961).

2 People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 122, 161 N.E. 441, 443 (1928).
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offered by the prosecution and exclude it if in no circumstances could the
confession be deemed voluntary. If the evidence presented a fair question 3
as to the voluntariness of the confession, the judge "must receive the confession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate deter4
mination of its voluntary character and also its truthfulness."
On June 14, 1960, at about 1:00 A.M., Jackson entered a Brooklyn
hotel, drew a gun, and took some money from the room clerk. Later, Jackson encountered a policeman on the street; a struggle occurred during
which both men drew their guns and fired. The policeman was fatally
wounded, and Jackson was shot in the chest, injuring his liver and one
lung. At about 2:00 A.M. Jackson was questioned at the hospital by a detective who testified that Jackson admitted committing the robbery, killing the
policeman, and firing the first shot. At 3:55 A.M. Jackson was given drugs
to prepare him for an operation. Immediately thereafter Jackson was questioned by an assistant District Attorney in the presence of hospital personnel. Jackson declined to answer the questions at first, but in response to
further questions he admitted shooting the policeman and admitted firing
the first shot.
Jackson was indicted for murder in the first degree. The statements
made by him at the hospital were introduced into the record. Jackson took
the stand and admitted the robbery and the shooting, but insisted that the
policeman drew his gun first and fired the first shot. He stated that he was
in pain, gasping for breath, was refused water, and was told he would not be
left alone until he gave the police the answers they wanted. He didn't
remember the questions asked nor the answers given. The state offered
testimony that Jackson was refused water because of the operation and that
the drugs administered had no effect on the interrogation.
Jackson's counsel requested a verdict of second degree murder or
manslaughter. Counsel's main effort was to negate the element of premeditation and intent necessary for first degree murder by separating the
robbery from the killing, and indicating that the policeman fired the first
shot.
The jury was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary, it
was to disregard it entirely and determine guilt or innocence solely from
the other evidence; alternatively, if it found the confession voluntary, it was
to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. The
jury found Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree. The conviction was
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.5 Jackson then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the New York procedure for
3 A fair question occurs ". . . where certain facts bearing on the issue are in dispute
or where reasonable men could differ over the inferences to be drawn from undisputed
facts .. " Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1781 (1964).
4 People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 416-417, 159 N.E. 379, 381-382 (1927).
5 People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 N.E.2d 59 (1961).
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determining the voluntariness of a confession was unconstitutional. The
District Court denied the petition, 6 and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In the majority opinion, 8 the Supreme Court held that a "defendant
objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in
which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined," 9 and that the New York
procedure did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of
the confession. Thus, Jackson was deprived of his constitutional right to be
free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession and his conviction
could not withstand constitutional attack under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
In determining that the New York procedure did not afford a reliable
determination of the voluntariness of the confession, the Court stressed the
fact that the New York jury returned only a general verdict upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. The Court pointed out several uncertainties produced by the New York procedure which caused it to be an unreliable determination of the voluntariness issues. First, it was impossible to
discover if the jury found the confession voluntary and relied upon it, or
involuntary and ignored it. Nor was there any indication of how the jury
resolved disputes in evidence concerning the crucial facts underlying the
voluntariness issue, or that these matters were resolved at all.
The disadvantages of these uncertainties were noted by the Court in
Stein v. New York." Since there is no separate decision on the confession
issue, a defendant, on appeal, does not know what result to attack, and a
reviewing court does not know if the confession was received or rejected as
evidence of guilt; therefore, there is an absence of assurance that the confession did not serve as make-weights in a compromise verdict. 12 Notwithstanding these difficulties in the New York procedure, the Supreme Court in
the Stein case had found no constitutional deprivation. The Court reached
that conclusion on the basis of alternative assumptions regarding the manner in which the jury might have resolved the coercion issue. Either the jury
6 Jackson v. Denno, 206 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
7 Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
8 The decision was 5-4 with Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissenting.
9 A fair question occurs ". . . where certain facts bearing on the issue are in dispute
or where reasonable men could differ over the inferences to be drawn from undisputed
facts .. " Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1781 (1964).
10 Confessions obtained from an accused by overpowering his will, whether through
physical violence or more subtle forms of coercion, are offensive to the constitutional
gt1?,rantee of liberty. A trial with the use of a coerced confession deprives an accused of
his liberty without due process of law. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 414, 62 Sup. Ct.
688, 690 (1942).
11 346 U.S. 156, 177, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1089 (1953).
12 Some jurors accepted the confession to overcome doubts of guilt, and yet others
never reached a separate and definite conclusion as to the confession, but returned an
unanalytical and impressionistic verdict based on all they had heard. Ibid.
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determined the disputed issues of fact against the accused, found the confession voluntary, and therefore properly relied upon it; or it found the facts
in favor of the accused and deemed the confession involuntary, in which
case it disregarded the confession and adjudicated guilt solely on the other
evidence.
The majority in the Jackson case denied the validity of the assumptions
used to support the constitutionality of the New York procedure in the
Stein case and specifically overruled the case. The Supreme Court felt that
the decision of the Stein case failed to recognize the dangers to an accused's
rights under either of the assumptions. The assumption that the jury found
the confession voluntary could only be arrived at on the further assumptions
that the jury had actually found the disputed issues of fact against the
accused, and that these findings were reliably arrived at in accordance with
considerations that are permissible and proper under federal law. The jury
is at once given both the evidence showing the voluntariness and all of the
corroborating evidence showing that the confession is true and that the
defendant committed the crime. Therefore, the jury may believe the confession and believe that the defendant has committed the very act with
which he is charged, which may in turn seriously distort judgment of the
credibility of the accused and his testimony concerning the critical facts
surrounding the confession. The jury may also find it difficult to understand
the policy forbidding reliance upon a coerced, but true, confession.' 8 That
a true confession must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all generates
pressure to find it voluntary. Otherwise, the jury may feel, the guilty will go
free.
The Supreme Court found the alternative assumption, that the jury
found the confession involuntary and disregarded it, equally unacceptable.
The defendant's confession is solidly implanted in the jury's mind because
it has not only heard the confession, but has been instructed to consider
and judge its voluntariness, and is in a position to assess whether it is true or
false. If the jury does find the confession involuntary, can the jury then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If there are doubts
about the sufficiency of the other evidence, can the jury consciously eliminate
the confession in making a determination, especially where the confession is
possibly true? The injection of the irrelevant and impermissible considerations of the truthfulness of the confession make it impossible to assume that
a jury has not been influenced by the confession in its final determination.
The Supreme Court in Jackson then concluded that since under neither
Is The policy behind forbidding reliance upon a coerced confession was based upon
the probable unreliability of the confession, the strongly felt attitude of our society that
important human values are sacrificed when an agency of the government in the course
of securing a conviction wrings a confession out of the accused against his will, and
because of the deep rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law; that in the end, life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382, 84 Sup Ct. 1774, 1785 (1964).
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assumption could it be reasonably assured that the voluntariness issue was
reliably determined, the New York procedure posed substantial threats to a
defendant's constitutional right to be free from a conviction based upon an
involuntary confession. Therefore, the New York procedure for determining
the voluntariness of a conviction was unconstitutional under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Harlan, emphasized the dependance
of our system of criminal justice on jury trials and the ability of a jury to
follow instructions. Mr. Justice Harlan believed that the basis of the
majority's decision was an unwillingness to entrust to a jury the sensitive
task of determining the voluntariness of a confession; he noted that in
particular the court hypothesized a variety of ways in which the jury may
have disregarded its instructions. He stated that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected speculation that the jurors disregarded instructions in
arriving at a verdict as a reason for adopting a particular trial practice. 14 He
concluded that the Supreme Court's constant refusal in the past to accept
as a rationale for decision the danger of jury incompetence demonstrated
the lack of constitutional foundation for its decision.
In answer to Mr. Justice Harlan, the majority opinion indicated that
every person, whether he be a judge or a juror, is not capable of disregarding
certain facts within his knowledge in arriving at a decision, but will be
influenced by his knowledge of these facts even if instructed to disregard
these facts. The majority opinion merely realized there was a limit on the
ability of a person to follow instructions, and a point where instructions
were incapable of being followed.
The Court in disposing of the Jackson case decided Jackson was entitled
to a separate hearing in the state court on the question of the voluntariness
of the confession, and if, at the conclusion thereof, it were determined that
the confession was voluntary there would be no constitutional necessity for
a new trial on the issue of guilt; but if the confession were determined to
be involuntary a new trial would be required without the confession in
evidence.
The holding in this case means that hundreds of prisoners in the state
of New York have been convicted in a manner which is unconstitutional.
The same is true of prisoners convicted in at least fourteen other states. 15
These prisoners, under the Court's holding, are entitled to a separate hearing on the voluntariness of their confession and a new trial if at this hearing
it is determined that the confession was involuntary. The decision, however,
14 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952); Delli Paola v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 Sup. Ct. 294 (1957).
15 The New York Procedure is followed in Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and the Second, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Federal District Courts. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 414, 84
Sup. Ct. 1774, 1801 (1964).
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does not solve all the problems in this area. If, after a separate determination is made, the confession is found to be involuntary, must the court
impanel a new jury to determine the guilt or innocence? If this were not
done, the jury might be influenced by the involuntary confession as was
pointed out in the Jackson case. 16
It should be noted that the Court in the Jackson case for the first time
rejected the presumption that juries follow the instructions of the court. 17
The Court made an objective appraisal of the presumption, and found it to
be unsound because under certain circumstances a jury cannot consciously
obey the court's instructions. The denial of the presumption that juries
follow the court's instructions indicates that in the future the Court will be
carefully examining the jury's duties during a trial to determine whether
they are capable of fulfilling these duties under the circumstances involved.
The Jackson case may be the start of a revision of American law concerning
the jury system.
R. EVANS

To
Mosby v.

TORTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A MALPRACTICE ACTION HELD
HAVE STARTED RUNNING

AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATION-In

Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1964),
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District was confronted with the
problem of when the statute of limitations should begin to run in an action
for a negligently performed surgical operation.
The plaintiff, Rowena Mosby, was operated on by agents of the
defendant hospital on March 25, 1956. On December 30, 1960, the plaintiff
underwent a second operation at another hospital. It was then discovered
for the first time that a needle had been left in the plaintiff's body during
the first operation. The needle had, by the time of the second operation,
passed into the area of the plaintiff's right knee and had caused serious
permanent damage.
The complaint consisted of two counts. The first count alleged that the
defendant's agents had negligently deposited a surgical needle in the plaintiff's body during the operation and had failed to remove it at the conclusion thereof. The second count repeated the allegations of the first count but
16 Another question likely to be presented to the Court will be whether the so-called
Massachusetts rule is constitutional. Under the Massachusetts rule the judge hears all the
evidence and rules on voluntariness before allowing the confession into evidence. If he
finds the confession voluntary, the jury is then instructed that it must also find that the
confession was voluntary before it may consider it, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 417,
84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1802 (1964). Some courts and commentators have been unable to see
any difference between the New York rule and the Massachusetts rule. Whatever the
theoretical variance, in practice the rules are likely to show a distinction without a true
difference.
17 Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 Sup. Ct. 716, 723 (1949)

(concurring opinion); Comment, 24 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1957).

